Ori Beck "A Defense of Phenomenal Particularity" Sponsors: Royal Institute of Philosophy, Scots Philosophical Association, Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience at the University of Glasgow, Rutgers University To register to attend the conference, please go to the Particularity of Perception's EventBrite page. " On representationalism, common-factorism, & whether consciousness is here & now"ġ5:30–17:00 Discussion panel: Jack Lyons (Arkansas/Cambridge), Keith Wilson (Edinburgh/Glasgow), Derek Brown (Glasgow)ġ8:30 Dinner, Ubiquitous Chip Brasserie, 12 Ashton Lane " How Naïve Realism can Explain Both the Particularity and Generality of Experience" " Phenomenological particularity and the concept object"ġ9:00 Dinner, Left Bank, 33-35 Gibson St. Are perceptual states individuated only by particular elements, only by general elements, or both? Assuming that perceptual states can be individuated by particulars, when this occurs is perceptual particularity a matter of the epistemic relation between the perceiver and her environment, the sensory character of the perceptual state, ontological features of the perceptual state, the content of experience, or a combination of the above? The workshop aims to address these and related questions. Kim’s case brings into focus two central questions that structure the debate on perceptual particularity. All three experiences are subjectively indistinguishable: from Kim’s perspective, it seems as if she saw just one watch. In the third experience, she hallucinates a watch and so is not perceptually related to any watch. Thus, in the second experience she sees a different watch. Then, unbeknownst to her, the watch is replaced by a numerically distinct but qualitatively identical watch. To motivate these questions, consider Kim, who has three distinct, consecutive experiences. What kind of mental state are we in when we are perceptually related to a particular? How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? When we perceive our environment, we are perceptually related to particulars such as objects, events, and property-instances in that environment. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Understanding the extent and sources of these particularities and generalities is a fundamental issue in philosophy, and perception is especially critical to our access to particularities. Although some mental states seem entirely general (e.g., the thought ‘Blue is a colour’), various mental states involve a complex interplay between particularities and generalities (e.g., the thought ‘this watch is blue’). It is most directly contrasted with generalities, notably including kinds of properties, objects and events (e.g., blue, Bulova watches, and sunrises, respectively). ![]() ![]() ![]() Particularity refers to instances of properties, or specific objects or events (e.g., a sample of blue, my favourite watch, and today’s sunrise in Glasgow, respectively). The aim of the workshop is to bring together philosophers of perception, metaphysicians, and epistemologists to debate issues surrounding the particularity of perception. Brown (Glasgow) and Professor Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers)
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